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Abstract: Economists have long recognized that richer countries trade more 
among themselves than with poorer economies due to a closer match of exporter 
supply structures and importer preferences.  In the literature, the closeness of 
supply and demand has traditionally been determined by the quality of products—
as expressed in the so-called Linder hypothesis.  This paper examines an 
extension of the Linder hypothesis by also considering the extent of horizontal 
product differentiation as another determinant of the closeness of supply and 
demand.  The empirical analysis employs information on international trademark 
registrations to test whether richer countries tend to import more from countries 
whose exports are of higher quality and exhibit a greater degree of product 
differentiation.  The results lend support to the hypothesis in most consumer 
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Economists have long recognized that richer countries trade more among 
themselves than with poorer countries due to a closer match of exporter supply structures 
and importer preferences.  Traditionally, the factor that determines the closeness of 
supply and demand has been the quality of products.  Linder (1961) first pointed out that 
richer countries are likely to spend a larger share of their income on higher quality 
products.  At the same time, more developed economies are likely to have a comparative 
advantage in producing high quality goods.  Hence, one would expect production in the 
rich world to match more closely consumption in the rich world, thus leading to relatively 
more trade among developed nations. 
A number of authors have formalized and extended Linder’s analysis of the role 
of product quality in trade.  In Murphy and Shleifer’s (1997) Ricardian trade model, the 
key variable determining both a comparative advantage in producing high quality 
products and a taste for high quality goods is a country’s endowment of human capital.  
Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) develop a model whereby demand for high quality 
products increases with consumers’ income and analyze how trade patterns are 
determined by cross-country differences in capital and labor endowments, production 
technologies and income distribution.
1 
Few empirical studies verify the predictions of the theoretical literature.  
Applications of the gravity model of bilateral trade have attempted to take into account 
the Linder hypothesis by adding the absolute difference in trading partners’ per-capita 
GDPs as an additional explanatory variable in the regression equation (see Leamer and 
Levinsohn, 1995).  The most careful study to date, Hallak (2001), develops a model of 
import demand that explicitly allows for cross-country differences in consumers’ 
preference for quality and estimates it using bilateral trade flows at the sectoral level.  
Differences in the quality of countries’ exports are captured by a quality index based on 
cross-country differences in unit values of US imports at the 10 digit Harmonized System 
level.  The study confirms that richer economies indeed import more from countries 
exhibiting a higher value of the quality index. 
                                                 
1 Further theoretical research on the trade and quality nexus can be found in Flam and Helpman (1987) and 
Stokey (1991).   3
However, a closer match between exporter supply structures and importer 
preferences may not only be due to product quality.  Exporters often horizontally 
differentiate their products and employ various forms of marketing to influence consumer 
preferences in the importing country.  If richer countries specialize in the production of 
more differentiated products—as in the Helpman-Krugman trade model—and consumers 
in richer countries have a more pronounced taste for such products, trading patterns will, 
inter alia, be biased towards trade among developed nations.
2  In addition, one would 
expect high quality production to be associated with horizontal product differentiation, 
reinforcing the traditional Linder hypothesis. 
This is the first study to use detailed data on international trademark registrations 
to test for such income-related biases in international trade.  This novel approach has two 
distinct advantages.  First, firms’ propensity to seek out trademarks for their products is 
likely to be a good indicator of both product quality and the extent of product 
differentiation.  As explained below, high quality and marketing-intensive producers face 
a higher risk of imitation and, therefore, tend to rely to a greater extent on the protection 
provided by the trademark system. 
Second, the use of trademark registration data can overcome some of the 
drawbacks of existing empirical research on the Linder hypothesis, which employs 
information on unit values.  Cross-country differences in unit values of imports can be 
due to quality but can also result from other considerations, such as differences in mark-
ups between countries, discounts for large quantities, buyer monopsony, as well as 
transport costs.  Even at a very disaggregated level unit values can suffer from the 
problem of aggregating dissimilar products.  Moreover, unit values may not accurately 
reflect quality as cross-country differences in relative costs can make countries price 
differently goods of the same quality.  Further, since countries may record quantities less 
accurately than they record the value of trade, unit values may suffer from a measurement 
error and thus a regression analysis using them as an independent variable (as is 
necessary in testing the Linder hypothesis) may lead to inconsistent estimates.  Finally, 
                                                 
2 Hummels and Klenow (2002) find that up to two-thirds of the expanded trade of larger economies’s can 
be explained by the fact that they trade a larger set of goods (rather than larger quantities of a common set 
of goods).  This evidence is consistent with the notion that richer countries have a comparative advantage 
in differentiated goods.   4
since for many countries unit values are available only at a very aggregated level 
researchers resort to employing unit values of US imports from various countries 
implicitly assuming that a particular country sells goods of the same quality to each of its 
export markets.  Information on trademark registrations does not suffer from these 
drawbacks.  In particular, on account of its wide coverage in terms of countries and time, 
we do not need to rely on quality proxies derived from the data for a particular importer. 
Our analysis proceeds in several stages.  We first review the basic economics of 
the trademark system (Section II).  Based on a newly constructed database of 
international trademark registrations, we then examine the determinants of bilateral 
trademark registrations in 22 sectors in 100 countries during the period 1994-1998 
(Section III).  We find that a country is more likely to register its trademarks in less 
distant economies and in countries where the same language is spoken.  Moreover, the 
strength of trademark protection in destination countries (where a mark is being filed) is 
positively correlated with the number of foreign trademarks registered.  The number of 
newly registered trademarks in a particular sector also depends on the worldwide volume 
of exports from the source country in the particular industry as well as the worldwide 
volume of imports in the destination country in this sector.   
Next we develop a conceptual model that introduces the expanded ‘Linder effect’ 
in a gravity type estimation framework (Section IV).  This model is then estimated using 
two proxies constructed from our trademark database (Section V).  First, we employ the 
share of an exporting country’s registrations in nonresident trademark registrations in a 
destination economy in a given sector.  We find support for income-related trade flow 
biases in 10 out of 22 regressions estimated at the sectoral level.  These biases can mainly 
be found in consumer goods industries, such as, food products, beverages, tobacco, 
wearing apparel and footwear, leather products and furniture.  No biases are detected in 
intermediate input sectors, including petroleum and coal products, industrial chemicals, 
other chemicals, iron and steel, rubber products, and non-metallic products.   
Our second proxy for export quality and horizontal product differentiation is the 
residual from a first stage regression of factors driving trademark registrations, including 
variables intended to capture demand for trademarks in a particular destination country.  
Using this measure, we find support for the Linder hypothesis in 14 of 22 sectoral   5
estimations.  Again the biases are present in consumer goods industries, such as, food 
products, beverages, wearing apparel and footwear and textiles.  They are also detected in 
the most trademark-intensive sectors, including other chemicals, professional and 
scientific equipment; paper, printing and publishing. 
As we conclude in the final section of the paper (Section VI), the evidence of 
income-related trade biases suggests that developing countries, which are less likely to 
produce high quality or horizontally differentiated products, may be at a disadvantage in 
selling their goods to the rich world.  This implies that reductions of trade barriers on 
manufactured goods in the developing—rather than the developed—world will have a 
stronger impact on developing country exports. 
 
 
II.  The economics of the trademark system 
Trademarks are words, signs, symbols or combinations thereof that identify goods 
as manufactured by a particular person or a company, therefore allowing consumers to 
distinguish between goods originating in different sources.  In order to receive legal 
protection against unauthorized use by third parties, businesses and individuals file 
trademarks in official registrars.  Such registrations are valid for a limited time period, 
typically ten years.  However, prior to expiration, trademark holders have the option of 
renewing their registrations.  Through continuing renewals, and absent any act or failure 
to act which might call the rights concerned into question, trademark registrations can 
virtually last forever.
3 
In practice, the number of trademarks sought out for a one product can vary 
substantially across producers.  For example, the brand of the Korean car manufacturer 
“Hyundai” is protected by 25 trademarks in the United States, whereas the Mercedes 
brand has 57 trademarks registered in the United States.
4  Typically, there are a number 
                                                 
3 A special case is when trademarks become part of the public domain.  For example, the “Xerox” or 
“Walkman” trademarks were judged to have become part of the common vocabulary and the trademark 
holders were asked by certain jurisdictions—against a financial compensation—to give up their exclusive 
rights. 
4 These trademark counts are counts of ‘live’ trademarks from the TESS database available at 
www.uspto.gov, as of August 2003.    6
of ways in which imitators can take advantage of consumers’ knowledge of a particular 
brand—ranging from the name of the brand to its logo, the design and other product-
specific features.
5 Obtaining a large number of trademarks serves as a more effective 
protection against product imitation.   
To better understand firms’ incentives to register trademarks in foreign nations, it 
is helpful to briefly review the relevant economic literature.  The fundamental economic 
rationale of trademark protection goes back to Akerlof’s (1970) seminal insight regarding 
the failure of markets to provide for an efficient allocation of resources if consumers are 
unable to assess the quality of products offered to them.  In this situation, information 
asymmetries between sellers and buyers prevent some transactions in high quality goods 
from occurring, thus leading to inefficiencies.  Trademarks offer a way around this 
dilemma.  As producers of goods develop a reputation for quality over time, consumers 
can use brand names to distinguish between a premium quality product and a low-end 
product.
6 
A trademark registration itself, however, says little about the level of quality of 
the underlying product.  Yet, there are a number of reasons why we would expect high 
quality producers to seek out more trademarks.  First, it is important to note that 
trademarks are not costless, especially when protection is sought in a large number of 
jurisdictions.  Besides the registration fee, firms have to incur expenses for legal services 
and possibly translation of the trademark application into a foreign language as well as 
bear the costs of monitoring for potential infringement.  Thus, a producer will only file an 
application if the expected benefits from protection exceed its costs. 
A variety of arguments can be invoked as to why the expected benefits from 
protection are likely to be larger for high quality producers.  A key benefit of protection 
is, of course, the reduced likelihood of brand imitation.  This likelihood is usually greater 
for high quality products, as the price premium relative to low quality products—and thus 
the pay-off from imitation—is larger.  Moreover, as originally noted by Nelson (1970), 
                                                 
5 In an econometric investigation on the optimal number of trademarks registered per firm in the United 
States, Sullivan (2001) finds that this number is related to the number and diversity of products, consumer 
knowledge of a firm’s product(s), and overall demand for the brand. 
6 Shapiro (1982) has shown that reputation mechanism can work only imperfectly, because high quality 
producers are rewarded only with a lag.     7
sellers of high-quality products have a greater incentive to spend money on advertising to 
persuade consumers to try their goods, because the present value of a trial purchase is 
larger than in the case of low-quality producers.
7  This also means that for a rational 
consumer, the fact that a firm spends money on advertisements provides in itself 
information on product quality—regardless of the advertising content.
8  Hence, 
consumers may have greater knowledge about advertised high quality products, once 
again increasing the pay-offs from and the likelihood of imitation.  Finally, the trademark 
registration itself may send a signal on quality, as consumers know that high quality 
producers face a greater risk of brand imitation.  Indeed, high quality manufacturers often 
convey explicitly that their brands are protected by trademarks (using symbols such as 
“®” or “TM”). 
The rationale of trademark protection goes beyond pure quality considerations, 
however.  Unless goods take the form of purely homogenous commodities, firms tend to 
differentiate their products horizontally.  For example, producers attach features to a 
product not necessarily linked to quality, such as the shape or color of goods.  For some 
categories of goods, the mere use or display of a particular branded product confers 
prestige on their owners.  Product differentiation strategies are often critical for 
maintaining competitiveness and firms often spend substantial resources on marketing 
their goods to consumers.  By identifying the original producer of a product, trademarks 
can be seen as a prerequisite for firms to recoup these investments in marketing.  If other 
firms could free ride on the original producers’ marketing efforts, no producer would 
have an incentive to invest in the marketing of goods and services.   
                                                 
7 Note, however, that Schmalensee (1978) who analyzes the relationship between advertising and product 
quality more formally, shows that under certain assumptions and parameter values, it is possible that the 
lowest-quality brands have the largest advertising budgets, market shares, and profits.  This is especially 
likely if buyers’ behavior indicates confidence that better brands spend more on advertising.  He concludes 
that “… while many of the natural generalizations of this model seem likely to reduce the incidence of 
negative advertising/quality correlations, I conjecture that most will not suffice to rule them out.” 
8 Klein and Leffler (1981) make a related argument.  They develop a model whereby consumers do not buy 
high quality products below a certain premium price that indeed gives firms an incentive to produce at high 
quality instead of cashing in on a short-term cheat.  If market entry is free, firms engage in non-price 
competition, involving sunk investments in the design of a firm logo and advertising.  These investments 
send a signal about high quality to consumers, as their non-salvageable character acts as a ‘collateral’ that a 
firm has indeed chosen the high quality business plan.   8
As above, the greater the importance of product differentiation strategies for a 
particular company, the greater is the risk of brand imitation and the greater are the 
benefits from the protection afforded by the trademark system.  All else equal, we would 
expect to see more trademark registrations in sectors in which product differentiation 
plays a more important role.  In addition, high quality producers typically rely to a greater 
extent on horizontal product differentiation than low quality producers, reinforcing their 
interest in protection against brand imitation.
9  All of the above mentioned characteristics 




III.  Determinants of international trademark registrations 
Before examining how quality and product differentiation affect trade patterns, it is 
helpful to investigate what motivates firms to register trademarks internationally.  In this 
section, we present the results of an exploratory regressions on the determinants of 
international trademark registrations.  Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
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where subscripts i, j, k and t stand for source and destination countries, sector and year, 
respectively.  Rijkt is the number of new trademarks registered by country i in country j in 
sector k at time t.  The figures on trademark registrations come from a database created 
by Baroncelli, Fink and Javorcik (2002) based on the data published by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  After adding data on trade and deleting the 
missing observations we obtained a database that contains information on bilateral trade 
flows and trademark registrations spanning from 1994 to 1998 and covering 22 source 
                                                 
9 In addition to providing incentives to invest in quality and marketing, the trademark system is also 
sometimes credited for encouraging product innovations by allowing firms to appropriate associated rents.  
For example, in a case study of the Benelux countries, Allegrezza and Guard-Rauchs (1999) find that firms 
registering trademarks tend to incur high research and development (R&D) expenditure.  Since one would 
expect a positive relationship between high quality production and R&D intensity, this finding can be 
viewed as  consistent with the notion that high quality producers seek out more trademarks.   9
countries, 100 destination countries in 22 three-digits ISIC manufacturing sectors.  The 
Data Appendix provides a list of all the source and destination countries and describes the 
concordance employed in matching sectors classified according to the Nice Trademark 
Classification System to the ISIC system (see Table 1). 
As explanatory variables, we incorporate the strength of the trademark protection 
regime in the destination country (TMProtectionj), as measured by the trademark 
protection index recently compiled by Reynolds (forthcoming).  This index is based on a 
detail analysis of national trademark regimes with regard to five broad criteria: the types 
of marks allowed, coverage, limitations to trademark ownership, procedural hurdles, and 
membership in international trademark-related treaties.  An index value is the simple 
average of the scores a country receives in these five categories. Higher values of the 
index correspond to stronger trademark regimes, and thus we would expect to find a 
positive coefficient on this variable.  Next, we include the value of sector k’s exports 
from source country i to the world (Xikt) and the value of sector k’s imports of destination 
country from the world (Mjkt).  We expect that large exporters of sector k products are 
likely to have a larger number of domestic trademarks in the industry, while large 
importers are more attractive destinations for trademark registrations.  The data on 
exports and imports come from the UN COMTRADE database.  We also control for per 
capita GDPs of source and destination country, expecting that richer countries are more 
likely to develop more trademarks, while better off destination are more likely to demand 
more high quality goods. The per capita GDP figures come from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. 
Further, we employ the well-known bilateral trade cost proxies, reasoning that 
closer commercial ties between nations will lead to more trademark registrations.  These 
proxies are the distance between the pair of countries and a dummy for common 
language.  The distance measure refers to the straight-line distance between nations’ 
capitals and was taken from the City Distance Calculator provided by VulcanSoft.
10  In 
addition, we construct a dummy variable that is one if the two countries are both 
                                                 
10 The software can be freely downloaded at www.vulcansoft.com.   10
members of the Madrid system—the international trademark registration system 
administered by WIPO that facilitates the filing of one trademark in multiple countries.
11 
Finally, since the trademark registration data for some countries include the sum 
of both new registrations and trademark renewals, which, unfortunately cannot be 
separated into subtotals, we include an additional dummy (Renewalj) in the regression to 
take this fact into account.  Further, since many successor states of the Soviet Union 
required re-registration of trademarks existing previously in the USSR, we add a dummy 
for these countries.  The summary statistics for all the variables used in the estimation are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of the above equation for each of 
the 22 three-digit manufacturing industries.  Each regression contains year dummies. The 
standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White method.  We 
find that the number of newly registered trademarks depends on the worldwide volume of 
exports from the source country in a particular industry, which seems intuitive as a larger 
export sector is likely to consist of more firms and cover a wider range of products.  
Similarly, the higher the GDP per capita of the source country the larger the number of 
registrations, which is consistent with the notion that more developed economies have a 
comparative advantage in the production of high quality and differentiated goods.
12   
Further, we find a positive impact of the worldwide volume of imports in the 
destination country in the same sector, which suggests that larger import markets attract 
more trademark registrations.  The results also indicate that registrations are more likely 
to take place in less distant economies, in countries where the same language is spoken 
and among countries that participate in the Madrid registration system.  The dummy 
variable for renewals and USSR successor states is mostly positive and significant, as 
expected.  The trademark protection index exhibits a mixed performance, with both 
positive and negative coefficients.  This may be explained by the possibility that the 
strength of trademark protection depends to a large extent on law enforcement, which 
may be inadequately captured by the index developed by Reynolds.   
                                                 
11 See Baroncelli, Fink and Javorcik (2002) for a brief description of the Madrid registration system. 
12 This result is also consistent with Hummels and Klenow (2002), who find that, adjusted for the size of a 
country’s labor force, richer economies tend to trade a wider range of products.   11
Contrary to our expectations, however, we find that the per capita GDP of a 
destination country is in most cases negatively correlated with the number of trademark 
registrations.  There are two possible explanations for this result.  First, given the low 
cost of registering trademarks relative to other fixed costs of entering foreign markets, 
firms may just seek out trademarks in every jurisdiction in which they have a commercial 
interest—although this possibility could only explain a non-significant coefficient.  
Second, it could be that trademark registrations during the 1994-1998 period were 
particularly high in a number of emerging markets represented in our sample.  While per 
capita income in these fast-growing markets is still relatively low, they may experience a 




IV.  Testing for income-related biases in trade: an empirical model 
In this section, we develop a simple model of bilateral trade that accounts for the 
‘expanded’ Linder hypothesis and that results in the well-known gravity type estimation 
equation.  Following Deardorff (1998), let consumer preference be portrayed by a utility 
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where  ijk c  is country j’s consumption of sector k’s good produced by country i,  k σ  the 
elasticity of substitution between any pair of countries’ products in sector k,  jk ρ  is 
country j’s (constant) share of expenditure devoted to sector k, and  ijk a  is a CES 
preference parameter.   This latter parameter is a function of the degree of product 
differentiation (vertical and horizontal) of country i’s good in sector k,  ik θ , and j’s   12
preference for quality and exclusiveness,  j β —both of which are assumed to be 
exogenously given.  Note that unless  j β  is the same across all countries and price 
differences exactly compensate for differences in  ik θ , quantity cannot perfectly substitute 
for quality.  The term  ijk a  thus captures the expanded ‘Linder effect.’ 
Consumers in j derive their income,  j Y , from producing domestic products  jk x  at 
prices  jk p .  They face trade cost inclusive prices of consumption goods  ik ijk p t , where the 
trade cost factor  ijk t  is assumed to be equal to one for the domestically produced good 
and greater than one for foreign produced goods.  Constrained maximization of (1) leads 






























jk p  is an index of trade cost inclusive prices 
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Multiplying (3) by the trade cost inclusive price  ik ijk p t  yields the value of exports from 
country i to j in sector k, 
k

























The variables on the right hand side are a mix of exogenous and endogenous 
variables.  To fully estimate the model, one would need to specify supply conditions.  
However, since we are primarily interested in the ‘Linder effect’ that is identified by 
bilateral variation in trade flows, we can proceed by employing importer and exporter 
specific dummy variables to control for the country specific exogenous and endogenous 
variables.
13  The advantage of this approach is that our empirical model embeds 
                                                 
13 This approach is consistent with recent empirical applications of the gravity equation, including 
Hummels (1999), Hallack (2001), Redding and Venables (2001), and Fink et al. (2002).  Note that the   13
alternative supply determinants of trade.
14  The resulting gravity type equation for 
bilateral trade between i and j in sector k can be expressed as: 
k
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where 
k
i E  is a set of exporter fixed effects, 
k
j I  is set of importer fixed effects, and 
k
ij ε  is a 
normally distributed error term.  A useful feature of our estimation equation (6) is that the 
inclusion of exporter and importer fixed effects can correct for the omission of  variables 
that are country specific (e.g., non-tariff barriers, differences in inland transportation 
costs, availability of export finance). 
We will capture the trade cost factor  ijk t  by bilateral distance and dummy 
variables for sharing a common language and joint participation in preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs).  The Linder term  ijk a  will be captured by the product of the 
importing country’s per capita income and a measure of the exporting country’s extent of 
product differentiation, as captured by our trademark registration data.  Since all these 
variables do not directly measure  ijk t  and  ijk a , the estimated coefficients will not 
represent estimates of the elasticity of substitution  k σ , but will also reflect the elasticities 
in the trade cost function and the Linder preference function, respectively. 
 
 
V.  Estimation Results 
In this section, we use our database on international trademark registrations to test 
the expanded Linder hypothesis in the estimation framework developed above.  There are 
several advantages to employing trademarks for this purpose.   First, information on 
trademark registrations has a wide coverage in terms of countries (and time), and thus in 
contrast to the earlier work by Hallak (2001) we do not need to rely on quality proxies 
                                                                                                                                                 
inclusion of importer and exporter fixed effects captures the multilateral resistance terms identified by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
14 Indeed, the gravity equation has been shown to be consistent with a variety of trade models, including the 
simple Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin theories as well as newer theories with increasing returns to scale 
and monopolistic competition.  See, for example, Anderson (1997), Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) and Deardorff (1998).   14
derived from the data for one particular importer.  Second, we do not employ unit value 
figures which, even at a very disaggregated level, can be problematic, as they may be 
capturing different products rather than different quality levels of the same good and may 
also reflect vertical pricing considerations in imperfectly competitive markets.
15 
One drawback of our database is that we only have information on the flow of 
new trademark registrations and not on the stock of existing registrations.  Surely, one 
would expect past trademark filings to have an effect on current trade patterns, especially 
in sectors with long product cycles.  At the same time, using the limited data that exist on 
trademark stocks, we find a strong positive correlation between stocks and flows as well 
as a strong positive correlation of bilateral trademark registrations over time.
16  Since 
most of the variation in our data is cross-section, the bias from using flow data is likely to 
be small.
17   
Using the trademark registration data, we construct two measures of quality and 
product differentiation of exports—each with its own advantages and disadvantages.  
First, we calculate the share of country i’s trademarks registered in country j in sector k at 
time t in all non-resident trademarks registered in country j in sector k at time t.  As 
explained in the previous section and reflected in equation (6), this variable enters the 
regression equation interactively with per capita GDP.  A positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on this interactive term would lend support to the Linder 
hypothesis.   
Note that the inclusion of exporter fixed effects explicitly controls for the overall 
size of a country’s exports.  Thus, while larger exporters are likely to exhibit greater 
                                                 
15 For example, see Maskus and Chen (2002) for a model of vertical pricing of a monopoly manufacturer 
who sells goods in a foreign market through an independent distributor. 
16 WIPO publishes data on countries’ total stock of trademarks in a given year (but not broken down by 
origin of the trademark holder or by industry).  The bivariate correlation between this aggregate stock 
figure and the total number of registration in the same year is 0.86. 
17 Another potential criticism of the use of trademark data is that cross-country differences in the number of 
registered trademarks may reflect differences in firms’ sophistication in using the trademark system.  It is 
not clear, however, whether developing countries are less sophisticated in this regard.  For example, 
Baroncelli, Fink and Javorcik (2002) show that middle income countries are heavy users of the trademark 
system, as reflected, for example, in the fact that the majority share of national registrations are from 
domestic residents.  For anecdotal evidence on how Chinese consumer-goods makers are starting to pay 
attention to brand building see The Economist (“Just do it” Chinese-style, August 2, 2003).  In any case, 
cross-country differences in country’s sophistication in using trademarks are absorbed by the exporter fixed 
effects included in our regressions.   15
trademark shares in the importing country, our regression approach tests the Linder 
hypothesis by relying only on the bilateral variation in the data within the same exporting 
country. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.  We find support for the Linder 
hypothesis in 10 out of 22 sectoral estimations.  Consistent with our intuition, the Linder 
hypothesis holds mainly in consumer goods industries, such as food products, beverages, 
tobacco, wearing apparel and footwear, leather products and furniture.  All of these 
sectors are intensive users of the trademark system—as measured by Baroncelli et al. 
(2001).  The hypothesis finds no confirmation in intermediate input sectors, such as 
petroleum and coal products, industrial chemicals, other chemicals, iron and steel, rubber 
products, non-metallic products.   As for the other variables, we find a negative and 
significant coefficient on distance and a positive and significant coefficient on the 
language dummy.  The impact of PTA participation, however, shows a mixed 
performance, which is in line with the previous gravity literature.
18 
The above approach has, however, one drawback.  It takes trademark registration 
shares as given and uses them as proxies for vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation, without controlling for other bilateral factors driving a decision to register 
a trademark, such as, distance or linguistic differences.   Therefore, in our second 
approach we explicitly control for determinants of trademark registrations other than 
product differentiation.  We employ the residuals of a first stage regression similar to the 
one presented in Section III.  One can think of a simple model whereby the supply of 
trademarks is perfectly inelastic (assuming trademark offices function smoothly) and the 
equilibrium number of trademarks is determined solely by the demand for registrations.  
Controlling for the size of the source country’s exports, importer specific effects, as well 
as the standard set of ‘bilateral ties,’ the difference between actual and predicted 
trademark registrations should reflect the average degree of product differentiation of 
goods traded between two countries.  
Specifically, we estimate the following first stage regression equation: 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Soloaga and Winters (1999) and Smarzynska (2001).   16
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In contrast to the exploratory regression in Section III, we include a set of 
importer fixed effects in this regression.  Since we are interested in obtaining a measure 
of product differentiation of goods supplied from country i to country j in industry k, 
these fixed effects allow us to control for (time invariant) determinants of demand for 
differentiated products in the destination country.  Since we are using importer fixed 
effects, we need to exclude the trademark protection index of the destination country 
which is a time-invariant variable.  Moreover, total sectoral imports and per capita GDP 
of the destination country j now only contribute to the explanation of variations in 
trademark flows over time.  Note that, unlike before, we do not include per capita GDP of 
the source country, as this would partly take away what we intend to measure with the 
residuals.   
The estimation results from the above equation estimated for each sector 
separately (not presented here) are very similar to those obtained in Section III.  We 
proceed by calculating the residuals from these estimations and employing them 
(interacted with per capita GDP of the destination countries) in the familiar gravity 
regression on bilateral trade specified in equation (6). 
As the figures in Table 5 indicate, the interaction between the proxy for product 
differentiation of exports (obtained in the first stage regression) and the importer’s GDP 
per capita lends support to the Linder hypothesis, bearing a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in 14 of 22 sectoral estimations.  While the presence of the effect 
in consumer goods industries is less discernible than before, the Linder hypothesis still 
holds in key consumer goods sectors such as wearing apparel and footwear, food 
products, beverages and textiles.  Moreover, the effect is also detected in the most 
trademark-intensive sectors (as identified in Baroncelli et al., 2001), including other 
chemicals, professional and scientific equipment; paper, printing and publishing.   
As for the other variables, distance takes on the usual significantly negative sign, 
language is mostly positive and significant, and the preferential trading dummy shows a   17
positive and significant coefficient in about half of the sectors, with only one coefficient 
being negative and significant. 
To summarize, we conclude that higher quality and horizontal product 
differentiation positively affects exports to rich country markets.  While each of the two 
proxies used has its own advantages and drawbacks and produces somewhat different 
results across sectors, one conclusion emerges from both approaches: quality and product 
differentiation matters more for consumer and trademark-intensive goods. 
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VI.  Conclusions 
This study has employed a novel approach, based on information on international 
trademark registrations, to test an expanded Linder hypothesis stating that richer 
countries tend to import higher quality and more differentiated goods.  The use of 
trademark data overcomes many of the drawbacks of the earlier literature relying on unit 
values of imports as a measure of import quality.  The study first explores international 
determinants of trademark registrations and then uses trademark registration data to 
derive two proxies for the extent of quality and horizontal product differentiation of 
traded goods.  The two proxies are subsequently interacted with per capita GDP of the 
importing country and incorporated into a gravity equation estimated at the industry 
level.  We find the Linder effect to be more pronounced in consumer goods and 
trademark-intensive sectors, but small or non-existent for a number of intermediate goods 
sector.   
The evidence in support of the expanded Linder effect may have some important 
policy implications.  It suggests that developing countries’ market access interests in the 
developed world may differ significantly from their market access interests in the 
developing world.  Further, it suggests that developing countries may be at a 
disadvantage in selling manufactured products to the rich world (see also Murphy and 
Shleifer, 1997), which may limit the benefits brought by the reduction of trade barriers in 
industrialized countries.     19
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Data Appendix 
 
Destination Countries: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benelux, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dem. 
People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Macau, 
Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Poland,  Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, 
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, T F Y R Macedonia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, 
Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Source Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of 
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Table 1.  Concordance between Nice Classification and ISIC Classification  
 
NICE classification  ISIC  ISIC classification 
1 351  Industrial  chemicals 
2,3,5 352  Other  chemicals 
4  354  Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 
6  371  Iron and Steel  
7  382  Machinery, except electrical 
8 381  Fabricated  metal  products 
9,10  385  Professional and scientific equipment 
11 383  Machinery,  electric 
12 384  Transport  equipment 
13,15,28 390  Other  manufactured  products 
14 372  Non-ferrous  metals 
16  341, 342, 356  Paper and products & Printing and publishing &Plastic products 
17 355  Rubber  products 
18 323  Leather  products 
19  369  Other non-metallic mineral products 
20 332  Furniture,  except  metal 
21  361, 362  Pottery, china, earthenware & Glass and products 
22,23,24,26,27 321  Textiles 
25  322, 324  Wearing apparel, except footwear & Footwear, except rubber or plastic 
29,30,31 311  Food  products 
32,33 313  Beverages 
34 314  Tobacco 
 
Source:  Developed by authors based on detailed descriptions of product and industry categories. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
           
Trademarks Registrations  173,574*  14.16 88.60 0.00 14193.00
Trade   102,066  67660.14 394175.30 0.00 22900000.00
Imports from the world  114,708  1503654.00 4125001.00 54.09 53700000.00
Exports to the world  162,659  6481474.00 14600000.00 240.39 125000000.00
GDP per capita destination country  156,574  7213.55 9889.46 139.19 41840.40
GDP per capita source country  173,580  21663.48 10619.65 455.21 43639.11
Trademark Registrationsijkt/Trademark registrationsjkt   161,364  0.05 0.10 0.00 1.00
Trade index Destination  132,990  0.46 0.15 0.00 0.77
Distance   158,224  6093.10 4415.05 0.00 19845.00
Madrid Membership    173,580  0.22 0.41 0 1
Renewal   173,580  0.10 0.30 0 1
Renewal USSR    173,580  0.04 0.19 0 1
  
 
* Of which 79072 are non-zero. 
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apparel  Food Products Beverages  Tobacco  Textiles Leather  Furniture  Rubber 
products 
ln Imports from the 
World  0.2875*** 0.3191*** 0.2350*** 0.2889*** 0.2459*** 0.1853*** 0.0581*** 0.1890*** 0.2126*** 0.2655*** 0.2171***
  (0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0227) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0160) (0.0187) (0.0153) (0.0257) (0.0226)
ln Exports to the World  0.9586*** 0.8855*** 0.5916*** 0.6705*** 0.5602*** 0.3846*** 0.2304*** 0.7323*** 0.5774*** 0.4262*** 0.4962***
  (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0296) (0.0174) (0.0202) (0.0177) (0.0142) (0.0225) (0.0208) (0.0232) (0.0200)
    
ln Distance  -0.4068*** -0.4547*** -0.3707*** -0.3298*** -0.5165*** -0.3960*** -0.3570*** -0.5568*** -0.4172*** -0.3875*** -0.4938***
  (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0255) (0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0260) (0.0257) (0.0240) (0.0257) (0.0269)
    
Madrid Member  0.2584*** 0.2449*** 0.3280*** 0.3506*** 0.3028*** 0.2999*** 0.1997*** 0.3360*** 0.2177*** 0.2998*** 0.4076***
  (0.0498) (0.0517) (0.0665) (0.0579) (0.0585) (0.0628) (0.0619) (0.0632) (0.0605) (0.0684) (0.0597)
Language   0.6283*** 0.8376*** 0.8483*** 0.8903*** 0.5784*** 0.5965***  0.1898** 0.5816*** 0.5236*** 0.6031*** 0.4311***
  (0.0756) (0.0808) (0.1025) (0.0853) (0.0871) (0.0924) (0.0908) (0.0978) (0.0890) (0.1001) (0.1029)
    
TM Protection  -0.3125** 0.5720*** 0.2247 0.0713 0.2227 0.3036  -0.0117 -0.1809 0.4953*** 0.0819 -0.3047*
  (0.1416) (0.1441) (0.1985) (0.1670) (0.1905) (0.1859) (0.1779) (0.1870) (0.1723) (0.1871) (0.1837)
Renewal  -0.2066*** -0.1194* -0.1438 -0.0600 -0.2870*** 0.0288  0.0798 0.1066 -0.1000 0.0474 -0.1452
  (0.0763) (0.0707) (0.0947) (0.0827) (0.0922) (0.0950) (0.0877) (0.0875) (0.0965) (0.0919) (0.0917)
    
Former USSR  0.6177** 0.6443*** 0.7352*** 0.7475*** 0.2890 0.1220  0.4174* 1.0666*** 0.7764*** 0.2716 0.3071
  (0.2818) (0.2315) (0.2771) (0.1917) (0.2719) (0.2512) (0.2163) (0.2611) (0.2421) (0.2793) (0.2273)
    
lnGDPpc Destination  -0.1723*** -0.1496*** -0.1666*** -0.2237*** -0.1358*** -0.1773*** -0.1777*** -0.1824*** -0.1508*** -0.3216*** -0.1921***
  (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0272) (0.0301) (0.0226) (0.0290) (0.0240) (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0364) (0.0261)
    
lnGDPpc Source  0.0254 0.1957*** 0.3727*** 0.7786*** 0.3691*** 0.1999*** 0.1619*** 0.3632*** 0.6526*** 0.3015*** 0.6315***
  (0.0253) (0.0198) (0.0293) (0.0265) (0.0235) (0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0277) (0.0329) (0.0308) (0.0425)
Constant  -10.5793*** -11.9195*** -9.2116*** -14.4350*** -7.7428*** -2.8346***  0.8491** -9.1620*** -10.5998*** -4.7472*** -8.6728***
  (0.4442) (0.3813) (0.5935) (0.5604) (0.5099) (0.4928)  (0.5955) (0.5949) (0.5870) (0.5635)
    
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
    
Number of obs.  3013  2880 2455 2610 2724 2538 1824 2140 2048 1931 1874
F stat  371.98  359.77 110.49 180.74 148.48 81.15 50.73 110.64 115.75 64.78 84.3
Prob >F  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared  0.62  0.62 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.29 0.26 0.42 0.45 0.33 0.40  26
Table 3 continued  
Industrial 





















ln Imports from the World  0.1824*** 0.2533*** 0.2207*** 0.1975*** 0.1505*** 0.2948*** 0.2022*** 0.1738*** 0.2002*** 0.2555*** 0.1096*** 
  (0.0250) (0.0228) (0.0204) (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0208) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0186) 
ln Exports from the World  0.4403*** 0.5187*** 0.5709*** 0.4658*** 0.8294*** 0.7308*** 0.6047*** 0.5651*** 0.5765*** 0.7602*** 0.3717*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0265) (0.0321) (0.0281) (0.0185) (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0160) 
             
ln Distance  -0.4298*** -0.4627*** -0.4477*** -0.4027*** -0.4054*** -0.4396*** -0.5166*** -0.3047*** -0.4373*** -0.4680*** -0.3770*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0234) (0.0244) (0.0299) (0.0250) (0.0224) (0.0252) (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0237) (0.0242) 
             
Madrid   0.2287*** 0.3821*** 0.4053*** 0.2028*** 0.3833*** 0.3429*** 0.3663*** 0.2147*** 0.2600*** 0.3686*** 0.3418*** 
  (0.0667) (0.0582) (0.0617) (0.0743) (0.0649) (0.0559) (0.0616) (0.0624) (0.0616) (0.0519) (0.0583) 
Language   0.5978*** 0.6766*** 0.5932*** 0.0080  0.4612*** 0.3832*** 0.6702*** 0.1908**  0.7546*** 0.4177*** 0.4206*** 
  (0.0989) (0.0827) (0.0931) (0.1096) (0.0920) (0.0834) (0.0824) (0.0902) (0.0983) (0.0820) (0.0895) 
             
TM Protection  0.1686  0.0010  -0.0216 -0.0407 -0.0348 0.1293  0.2568  0.6207***  0.6412***  -0.0471 -0.4727** 
  (0.1884) (0.1663) (0.1870) (0.2074) (0.1827) (0.1558) (0.1701) (0.1648) (0.1827) (0.1662) (0.1860) 
Renewal   -0.1966**  -0.1020 -0.0289 -0.0134 0.0448  0.1529**  -0.0674 -0.1584*  0.0760  0.0658  0.1223 
  (0.1004) (0.0846) (0.0869) (0.0998) (0.0817) (0.0683) (0.0846) (0.0941) (0.0848) (0.0759) (0.0867) 
             
Former USSR  0.4862** 0.4326** 0.5176** 0.5474*  0.1773  0.5498***  0.6131** 0.3113  0.7935***  0.7948***  0.2519 
  (0.2263) (0.2182) (0.2476) (0.2935) (0.2037) (0.1903) (0.2435) (0.2720) (0.2951) (0.2129) (0.2080) 
             
ln GDPpc Destination  -0.1991*** -0.1764*** -0.1470*** -0.2361*** -0.1858*** -0.1655*** -0.1676*** -0.1188*** -0.2132*** -0.1340*** -0.1781*** 
  (0.0336) (0.0245) (0.0241) (0.0307) (0.0283) (0.0220) (0.0254) (0.0269) (0.0278) (0.0216) (0.0221) 
             
ln GDPpc Source  0.4134*** 0.4402*** 0.3220*** 0.4795*** 0.2423*** 0.0829*** 0.1645*** 0.0705*** 0.3733*** 0.4020*** 0.3874*** 
  (0.0282) (0.0265) (0.0249) (0.0310) (0.0298) (0.0232) (0.0252) (0.0262) (0.0260)   (0.0262) 
             
Constant  -4.8688*** -7.9487*** -8.3097*** -7.2945*** -11.0059***  -10.7036***  -7.2971*** -7.5859*** -8.0385*** -12.6702***  -3.3352*** 
  (0.5523) (0.5136) (0.5941) (0.6573) (0.5416) (0.4648) (0.5191) (0.4497) (0.5121) (0.4432) (0.4409) 
             
Year Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
             
Number of obs.  1981 1961 2071 1889 1645 2394 2292 2214 2257 2377 1671 
F stat  73.25 100.4 90.17 64.56  108.88  165.17  103.79  100.58  101.4  193.49  80.63 
Prob >F  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared  0.32 0.41 0.35  0.3  0.44 0.49 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.52 0.34 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   27
































Products  Beverages Tobacco  Textiles  Leather  
Products  Furniture 
Linder term   0.0043 0.0102 0.0167  0.1504***  0.1705***  0.1573*** 0.1524**  0.0706**  0.0724*  0.0662** 
  (0.0290) (0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0382) (0.0312) (0.0380) (0.0608) (0.0290) (0.0390) (0.0296) 
            
Distance  -1.2092*** -0.8925*** -1.5588*** -1.5181*** -1.4877*** -1.3451*** -1.1773*** -1.6172*** -1.5956*** -1.7471*** 
  (0.0321) (0.0333) (0.0357) (0.0435) (0.0410) (0.0577) (0.0963) (0.0395) (0.0495) (0.0463) 
            
Language  1.1863*** 1.0951*** 1.1545*** 0.9582*** 0.9502*** 1.1303*** 0.7785*** 0.8627*** 0.9123*** 0.9368*** 
  (0.0958) (0.0876) (0.0858) (0.0883) (0.0847) (0.1072) (0.1874) (0.0843) (0.1010) (0.0896) 
            
PTAs  -0.0663 -0.0257 -0.0917  0.2220**  0.2220**  -0.0415 3.2778***  0.2624***  -0.3000*** -0.0326 
  (0.0786) (0.0696) (0.0775) (0.0967) (0.0881) (0.1243) (0.2640) (0.0812) (0.1093) (0.0978) 
            
Destination Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Number of obs.  4833 4798 4857 4573 4639 4041 2156 4627 4235 4261 
F stat  223.95 281.58 259.03 239.28 171.15  129.3                 na  177.12  147.99  170.57 
Prob > F stat  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   na  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R squared  0.82 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.58 0.79 0.76 0.79   28































Linder term   -0.0095 -0.0022  0.0020  0.0247  -0.0091  0.0690***  0.0103  0.0472** 0.0501  0.0451*  -0.0158 0.0497 
  (0.0223)  (0.0242) (0.0298) (0.0317) (0.0375)  (0.0224)  (0.0195) (0.0241)  (0.0334)  (0.0234)  (0.0235)  (0.0521) 
                     
Distance  -1.4772***  -1.5558*** -1.6113*** -1.7905*** -1.7270***  -1.4452***  -1.1333*** -1.0753***  -1.2720*** -1.1742***  -1.4000*** -1.1681***
  (0.0381)  (0.0405) (0.0436) (0.0478) (0.0515)  (0.0356)  (0.0280) (0.0345)  (0.0436)  (0.0354)  (0.0319)  (0.0807) 
                     
Langauge  1.0561***  1.0717*** 1.1009*** 0.7003*** 0.9662***  1.0866***  1.0675*** 1.0804***  0.9866***  1.2355***  0.6317***  0.6681*** 
  (0.1011)  (0.0995) (0.1025) (0.0964) (0.1064)  (0.0854)  (0.0728) (0.0880)  (0.0940)  (0.0919)  (0.0828)  (0.1535) 
                     
PTAs  0.6833*** -0.0415  -0.1461  0.2512**  -0.1842  -0.2800*** -0.2829***  0.0119  0.6270*** -0.1545*  -0.1005  -0.0400 
  (0.0876)  (0.0890) (0.1004) (0.1020) (0.1158)  (0.0745)  (0.0616) (0.0752)  (0.0996)  (0.0828)  (0.0694)  (0.1914) 
                     
Destination Country dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source Country dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                     
Number of obs.  4571  4599 4294 4381 4212  4716  4880 4824  4650  4685  4751  2913 
F stat  190.91  175.02 144.98 135.57 132.46  250.18  326.19 255.01  180.96 257.2 251.83  48.91 
Prob > F stat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R squared  0.8  0.79 0.76 0.76 0.74  0.83  0.87 0.84  0.78  0.84  0.84  0.54 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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products  Beverages Tobacco  Textiles  Leather 
products  Furniture  Rubber 
products 
Linder Term  0.027*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.028***  0.006 0.006** 0.005 0.002 0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
ln Distance  -1.202*** -0.880*** -1.398*** -1.541*** -1.480*** -1.395*** -1.167*** -1.627*** -1.569*** -1.671*** -1.331*** 
  (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) (0.050) (0.041) (0.058) (0.116) (0.039) (0.057) (0.048) (0.040) 
        
Language Dummy  1.164*** 0.985*** 1.201*** 0.955*** 0.800*** 1.106*** 0.602*** 0.840*** 0.933*** 1.028*** 1.005*** 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.095) (0.083) (0.107) (0.223) (0.092) (0.124) (0.104) (0.110) 
        
Preferential Trade   0.129  -0.015 0.258*** 0.274** 0.490*** 0.209 3.316*** 0.210** -0.169 0.085 0.665*** 
Agreement  (0.081) (0.069) (0.085) (0.111) (0.100) (0.147) (0.307) (0.102) (0.137) (0.110) (0.111) 
        
Constant  13.561*** 10.083*** 13.833*** 13.434*** 19.671*** 15.183*** 10.459*** 17.667*** 12.887*** 15.641*** 11.827*** 
  (0.344) (0.357) (0.474) (0.633) (0.544) (0.688) (1.284) (0.528) (1.100) (0.559) (0.565) 
        
Number of obs.  3511 3318 2837 2962 3073 2695 1405 2440 2238 2129 2100 
F stat  200.99 232.51 197.89 157.1 134.45 na  na 119.49 na 117.13 na 
Prob > F stat  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 na  na 0.00 na 0.00 na 
R-squared  0.84 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.57 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.83 
        
Year Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Destination Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Source Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Linder Term  0.002 0.007**  0.003  0.004 0.012***  0.007***  0.003  0.009*** 0.002  0.014***  0.019*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
                     
ln Distance  -1.444*** -1.541***  -1.722***  -1.635*** -1.361***  -1.043*** -1.013***  -1.133*** -1.198*** -1.374*** -1.328*** 
  (0.042) (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.054) (0.044)  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.090) 
                     
Language Dummy  1.091*** 1.103***  0.605***  0.745*** 1.066***  0.930***  0.987***  1.012***  1.054***  0.710***  0.730*** 
  (0.109) (0.107)  (0.091)  (0.124) (0.096)  (0.068)  (0.084)  (0.104)  (0.101)  (0.077)  (0.170) 
                     
Preferential Trade   0.190*  0.173 0.333***  0.332**  0.022 -0.079 0.043  0.865***  -0.221**  0.139*  -0.235 
Agreement  (0.109) (0.122)  (0.115)  (0.140) (0.117)  (0.069)  (0.087)  (0.114)  (0.097)  (0.078)  (0.242) 
                     
Constant  13.235*** 13.248***  15.046***  15.703*** 12.518*** 11.936*** 11.378*** 12.420*** 11.972*** 14.298*** 8.785*** 
  (0.668) (0.720)  (0.670)  (0.889) (0.640)  (0.471)  (0.553)  (0.809)  (0.499)  (0.544)  (1.861) 
                     
Nr. Observations  2228 2163  2290  2091 1864  2745  2624  2553  2530  2745  1570 
F stat  108.85  na  na  96.99  151.39 na 168.78  119.77 na 180.65  na 
Prob > F stat  0.00  na  na  0.00  0.00 na 0.00  0.00 na 0.00  na 
R-squared  0.82 0.79  0.81  0.8  0.85  0.9  0.86 0.8  0.86  0.86  0.61 
                     
Year Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Destination Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Source Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 